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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to provide a new framework of analysis for understanding China’s international 
relations. It argues that “traditional” conceptions of international relations, based on “statist” and 
“realist” methodology, do not capture the dynamics of China’s international relations in an era of 
globalisation. Rather, we need to consider the analytical tools of international political economy as a 
means of breaking down the barriers between the domestic and the international, and between politics 
and economics. At the same time as enriching the study of China, such an approach can also enrich the 
discipline of international political economy, by breaking away from the OECD-centric nature of much 
research in the field. 
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Introduction 
This paper is in some ways a paper of frustration – a frustration that emerges from the pitfalls that 
emerge in many of the dominant approaches to considering China’s international relations (IR) in an 
era of globalisation. Immediately, we face a large analytical problem as my basic premise runs the risk 
of caricaturing a vast canon of literature. Nevertheless, and accepting this risk, I suggest that much of 
what is written on Chinese IR – particularly from inside China – is methodologically overly-statist and 
realist. In particular, I suggest that it fails to address the analytical problems of separating the domestic 
from the international, and separating economics from politics.  
 
This basic failing can be addressed by deploying the analytical tools of International Political Economy 
(IPE). Nevertheless, much of the wider work on IPE and globalisation also contains methodological 
problems. On one level, there is a tendency, particularly within China, to equate IPE with rational 
choice theory which has become “hegemonic” in much of the US academe. As such, IPE as a 
framework of analysis for Chinese scholars is frequently (and rightly in my view) rejected. On another 
level, much of the “critical IPE”, as I will call it, that has considerable purchase outside the US also has 
methodological flaws. It is too often informed by theories developed by examining advanced 
industrialised economies, or tries to find a once and for all overarching explanation of the relationship 
between states and markets, or takes the nation state as the basic unit of analysis (or in some cases, all 
three). While critical IPE studies of the implication of globalisation and the state have become more 
“pluralistic” in case studies1, and more nuanced in approach, many modes of analysis still do not 
transfer efficaciously to the study of developing states. 
 
Building on Payne’s analysis of the political economy of area studies2, the objective of this paper, then, 
is both quite straightforward and rather grand at the same time. In terms of studying China’s IR as 
policy and Chinese IR as academic discourse, I argue that we need to move beyond the study of 
bilateral relations and statist/realist approaches to take into account different processes of, and actors 
in, IR in the contemporary world. By modifying the work of those in a Coxian tradition, particularly  
the New Political Economy (NPE) approach associated with Payne and Gamble among others, we can 
provide a framework for analysing the increasing complexity of policy making – a framework which 
respects the inherent power of states, but also considers the power of sub-state and non-state actors in 
the global political economy. In the process, I suggest that the divisions between “politics” and “IR” 
become ever more blurred as the global becomes embedded within the domestic. In this respect, it is 
perhaps Chinese political science, more than IR, that faces the biggest challenges of coming to terms 
with the contemporary order. And in particular, I suggest that the study of Chinese IR as a discipline 
needs to become less dependent on US IR approaches and discourses, even if the US remains the 
dominant policy issue in the study of IR.  
 
In terms of studying IPE, I argue that the discipline needs to become more sensitive to case studies 
from the developing world, with a recognition of the different characters of “the state” outside the 
advanced industrialised world. This can be achieved by enriching the theory with more case studies 
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built on a detailed knowledge of the specifics of individual examples to provide a truly comparative 
basis for the development of theory.  
 
As such, the debates, conflicts, and separation (largely in the US) of area studies and “scientific” 
discipline obstruct the emergence of pluralistic understandings of Chinese IR under conditions of 
globalisation. If we accept that markets and capitalist forms are culturally, politically, historically and 
culturally embedded, then it is not a matter of area versus discipline, but one of combining the two. By 
marrying “area studies” and IPE, both can become more enhanced as analytical frameworks and 
provide a set of research questions and/or hypotheses to illuminate future studies of China’s political 
economy. And by way of a preliminary offering, I propose the following hypotheses to guide our study 
of the impact of globalisation on the study of Chinese IR. 
 
First, globalisation further blurs the divisions between the domestic and the international, and between 
politics and economics. Second, globalisation leads to a renegotiation of relationships between state 
actors within the national sphere. Third, globalisation increases the number of actors in IR. Finally, 
globalisation at the very least leads to perforated sovereignty, and increases the power of external 
actors over domestic policy3. 
 
International Relations Studies of China 
One of the main argument in this paper is that dominant approaches to studying Chinese IR place too 
great an emphasis on the national state as the level of analysis, and is built on statist and realist notions 
of international relations. Before going any further, it is important to reiterate my comment in the 
introduction that I am not making a Kenichi Ohmaeesque4 argument that the state is irrelevant to the 
functioning of the international system – that the state is “dead”. It would be meaningless to consider 
China’s IR without recognising the importance of formal diplomatic and government to government 
relations. It is also meaningless to deny the importance of the state as the key actor in China’s IR, and 
even China’s international economic relations. I will argue later that a key dynamic in China’s IR is the 
relationship between local state actors, and international non-state actors. But that is not to deny that 
“high” politics at the national state level creates the conditions within which this localised relationship 
takes place. Taiwanese businessmen may play an important role in shaping the evolution of places like 
Dongguan5, but the national state organs still retain overall control of the relationship between Taiwan 
and the PRC. It is not one or the other, but how the two interact. 
 
Nevertheless, I do suggest that on their own, statist and intergovernmental levels of analysis do not tell 
the full story. In particular, I argue that the focus on bilateral relations at the national level misses key 
determinants of China’s IR, and the way in which external forces partially shape the evolution of 
China’s political economy – particularly, but not only, in light of China’s WTO entry. First, I simply 
argue that the mainstream IR literature misses the salience of economic actors – particularly non-state 
economic actors. Second, I suggest that national levels of perception miss the uneven geographical and 
sectoral pattern of China’s international economic relations and the political implications of this 
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process6. It is true that many in China and outside have long recognised the importance of local 
authorities in forging China’s international economic relations, and there is a considerable literature in 
this area. But haven taken these analyses down to the local, I argue that they need to go beyond the 
bilateral, and be taken back to the global (or at least the regional) – to consider how these local 
manifestations of globalisation are linked to transnational global capitalist processes. In short, the task 
is to consider the linkages between domestic politics, domestic economics, international relations, and 
international economics. Processes of globalisation generate both localised and internationalised 
networks of relationships that need to be considered alongside the bilateral to gain a full understanding 
of how best to theorise contemporary Chinese international relations. 
 
There is now a relatively developed literature on the development of IR as a discipline within China, 
and the development of a Chinese IR theory. Outside China, the most well known are not surprisingly 
those written in English by scholars (many of whom have spent considerable time outside China) such 
as Gerald Chan7, Wang Feiling and Yong Deng8, Zhang Yongjin9, Jia Qingguo10, Wang Jisi11 and so 
on. And while IR in China is still a relatively new discipline, there is a good body of work assessing the 
discipline in China by people such as, Su Changhe, Wang Liping, Peng Zhaochang, Yuan Ming, Song 
Xinning and so on.  
 
It would be wrong to say that all Chinese IR utilises blunt realist methodologies12. Zhang Yongjin has 
correctly also identified an increasing interest in the English School as a methodological tool within 
Chinese IR, whilst accepting that US informed realist approaches continue to dominate13. In 
establishing the new IR programme at Yanshan University, Wu Yong has developed a programme 
which owes much to his doctoral studies in Durham under David Armstrong. 
 
Constructivist ideas, particularly those associated with Thomas Risse, are beginning to influence the 
work of some Chinese scholars such as Su Changhe14, while Chen Zhimin is also exploring how 
international structures influence China’s international policy options15. It is perhaps worth noting here 
that for classical realists (if not neorealists) the journey from realism to constructivism is not a 
particularly long one16. The domestic-international linkage has also been explored by those scholars 
considering the impact of globalisation on China. Perhaps the best known, and one of the earliest 
scholars to engage in debates over globalisation (and from my reading the most cited), is Wang 
Yizhou17.  
 
There is also an increasing awareness of IPE as academic discourse, with courses now available at 
Renmin and Fudan Universities at least. Song Xinning18 and Fan Yongming19 from Renda and Fuda 
respectively, have both produced volumes on IPE which cover a wide range of thinkers and 
approaches. However, I would contend that both of these volumes are about IPE rather than IPE texts 
in themselves, in that they describe western approaches to the (sub)discipline, rather than deploying 
these approaches to analyse Chinese politics and IR. The same is also true of Wang Yizhou’s volume 
on “Western International Political Study”20. As with early studies of IR in China in the late 1970s and 
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early 1980s, these works at the moment acknowledge and consider these approaches, without (broadly 
speaking) using them.  
 
So it is important to accept that the IR discipline in China is not static, and that new ideas and 
approaches are being discussed. Nevertheless, I think that it is still fair to say that there are three main 
problems that obstruct the emergence of a Chinese IR that can deal effectively and in a nuanced 
manner with IR under conditions of globalisation.  
 
An American-Centred Discipline? 
The first is an over concentration on relations with the United States, and the “conditioning” element 
that this places on Chinese IR. It is clearly the case that the US is objectively more important for China 
than, for example, the European Union, or individual European states for Chinese policy makers and 
researchers. That being said, it is instructive that in Wang and Yong’s “In the Eyes of the Dragon”21 
there is no chapter at all on Europe (including Russia) – and not only are Europe and European states 
absent from the contents list, but also absent from the index.  The single reference to any European 
state is three lines on the UK handover of Hong Kong.   
 
While this Americancentricism is understandable through a policy lens, there is another dimension to 
be considered here. Through the provision of scholarships and grants, a period of study in the United 
States is still the most probable and attractive option for Chinese IR scholars wishing to study in the 
west – through which the dominance of US perspectives in international relations22 is partially 
transmitted to the emerging IR community in China.  
 
This brings me to a second point. Much of the IR literature in China remains concerned with issues of 
sovereignty and statehood and is built on realist and statist methods. For Song Xinning: 
 “The overarching constraint [on IR theory in China] is a structural one, being the social 
setting in which the study of IR in China takes place.”23  
He goes on to argue that the main domestic constraints are the dominance of policy related research, 
the residual ideology, and the importance of the state itself in Chinese discourses.  
 
I would suggest a further constraint, in that much of the work in China on IR strikes me as still being 
informed by a Cold War framework. The strategic triangle approach to considering China’s place 
between Moscow and Washington served well as an approach during the Cold War. Much of what has 
been written about China’s place in the world appears to be seeking for new third poles to replace the 
now absent Soviet Union – to find something that might act as a counterbalance to US hegemony in a 
post-Cold War unipolar system. While this is understandable given the importance of the US for China, 
moving from a cold war geo-strategic framework to a post-Cold War framework of globalisation 
remains an incomplete task. 
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For Song, making such a transition is problematic as “the divides which separate discipline s and 
institutions are still very deep in China”24. This separation, has obstructed the emergence of an IPE 
which considers the importance of non-state actors and economics in general in the study of IR. Whilst 
there is an IPE discipline in China, it has emerged in the shado to the type of IPE which again is 
heavily influenced by US academia. On one level, Zhu Wenli’s paper in Contemporary China on IPE 
in China reveals a focus on an IPE which is heavily statist, and largely defined in response to US IPE 
theories as analytical tools – particularly hegemonic stability theory25. As she argues: 
 “The emergence of global issues is portrayed as the expansion of the diplomatic arena.”26 
The issues that now face governments may be increasingly transnational in character, but the solution 
is still seen as being found in intergovernmental dialogue and processes. Under this approach, 
economic affairs often ignored as being “economics” or more often subsumed as a subject that can be 
dealt with by state-to-state relations. 
 
On another level, Song and Chan argue that there is a strong concept in China that equates IPE with: 
 “The approaches used by Western scholars in IPE studies, such as rational choice, game 
theory, mathematical and statistical methods”27 
Again, this reflects the over-dependence on the US as a source of ideas – even if those ideas are being 
rejected - in the Chinese IR and IPE discipline(s). As we shall see in the debate over areas studies 
below, many within the US are also concerned about the dominance of rational choice approaches as a 
methodological “science” for studying international relations. And a conception of IPE as a framework 
of analysis that moves beyond the dominance of US approaches can help provide methodological tools 
that really can take us a step further in theory building.  
 
At the very least, it is fair to say that non-statist critical IPE has yet to make a significant impact on 
Chinese international relations studies. Little focus is placed on whose interests within individual 
countries are being served by these economic initiatives. Nor is much attention placed on the role of 
non-state actors – for example, the role of those that Strange terms the “international business 
civilisation”28 or Cox would describe as the “transnational managerial class”29 that “play an major role 
in almost all levels of the regional policy-making process”30. 
 
The above is not intended to “rubbish” Chinese academia – far from it. Very similar comments could 
be made about the majority of western observations of IR in general, and Chinese IR in particular. 
Wæver has shown, for example, how publications in the mainstream IR journals in general are 
dominated by rational choice and realist approaches (and also by authors based in the US)31. Nor is 
China the only country where the link between academia and policy making can create methodological 
myopia. Indeed, I would suggest that much writing on China in the US “suffers” from the problem of 
being too closely related to policy issues. As times it is difficult to know whether some scholars are 
writing about US policy towards China, or trying to write that policy itself. It is also the case that much 
of the US literature on China’s IR also ignores, for example, the position of Europe. In a rather neat 
comparison with Wang and Deng, neither does Johnston and Ross’s edited collection on “Engaging 
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China” have a single chapter on Europe32. Finally, divisions between disciplines are also strong outside 
China33. There is, for example, a considerable literature that discusses China’s international economic 
relations – but the division between economics, IR, and political and economic geography remain 
largely entrenched.  
 
I suggest, then, that IR specialists in China and without need to look further than just the US for the 
theoretical models used to analyse Chinese IR. And if this is the case for IR theorists, it also holds true 
in different ways for those who would consider themselves to be in the “area studies” camp as well. 
 
Area Studies versus Economics and Rational Choice Theories 
The debate over the relationship between area studies and discipline has been raging in the US for over 
half a decade now. A key impulse for this debate was the decision to fill the chair in Japanese politics 
vacated by the retiring Chalmers Johnson with a specialist in rational choice theory, largely considered 
by insiders in the Asian studies community to have little to no background in Japanese studies. Broadly 
speaking, the complaints from the area studies disciplines revolve around the notion that economics, 
and its bastard offspring, rational choice theory, have become hegemonic in academic discourses. 
According to Johnson34, rational choice theorists are attempting to promote their agenda by 
discriminating against “unscientific” area studies.  
 
The dominance of rational choice theory in much of US political science does create significant 
problems for the study of politics and international relations. So too do interpretations of policy based 
on pure economic theory. Take, as just one example, this section from a World Bank report on the 
potential impact of the WTO on Chinese agriculture: 
 “Over the longer term, increased liberalization in China will accelerate the shift of agriculture 
away from areas of comparative disadvantage towards its comparative advantage. There is 
likely to be a more pronounced decline in the production of land-intensive sectors, such as 
livestock, fruit, flowers and vegetables. Liberalization of global agricultural barriers should 
augment this trend as it provides China with increased access to other countries’ markets in 
return for its one-sided concessions”35 
The economic theory might be sound. But let’s assume for a moment that people all do act as rational 
actors based on full knowledge. Even then, it is difficult to imagine the peasant trying to scratch a 
living out of the barren earth in Shaanxi having the knowledge, the wherewithal and investment, and 
indeed even the right type of land and climate to make such a change. Geography, topology, and nature 
can be frustrating obstacles to the transference of economic theory into practice.  
 
It is not my intention here to embark on a detailed account of the relationship between politics and 
economics in IPE – that has been done by others36. Suffice to say that within the IFIs, economistic 
approaches have come to dominate much research, and also to have a disproportionate influence on 
policy making methodology. But while it is right to be sceptical of the efficacy of economic theory, and 
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its bastard offspring of rational choice as explanatory tools and methods, it is important not to fall back 
into a defence of area studies that denies the relevance and utility of all theoretical approaches.  
 
Area studies as an academic programme in the United States in the post War era owed much to the 
conditions of the Cold War. In perhaps the classic interpretation of the evolution of Area Studies in 
Cold War USA, Bruce Cumings notes: 
“For a generation after World War II the bipolar conflict between Moscow and Washington 
and the hegemonic position of the United States in the world economy drew academic 
boundaries that had the virtue of clarity: ‘area studies’ and ‘international studies’, backed with 
enormous public and private resources, had clear reference to places or to issues and processes 
that became important to study. The places were usually countries, but not just any countries: 
Japan got favored placement as a success story of development, and China got obsessive 
attention as a pathological example of abortive development. The key processes were things 
like modernization, or what was for many years called ‘political development’ toward the 
explicit or implicit goal of liberal democracy.”37 
 
At the very least, the need to understand what was going on in the “closed” environments of 
communist party states inspired many of the university degrees and scholarships to study language and 
culture. Building on McGeorge Bundy38, Cumings notes the close relationship between many US 
academics and the US Office of Strategic Studies, and how the US area studies community found much 
of its funding39. In Europe, too, Cold War politics played a part in shaping academic interest, courses 
and programmes. For example, the special foreign office funding for the School of Oriental and 
African Studies at the University of London, whilst initially inspired by the needs of serving the British 
Empire, was at least invigorated by the needs of the foreign policy community to train specialists to 
understand places like China.  
 
In some respects, then, the area studies discipline, like Chinese IR, needs to come to terms with the 
changing geo-strategic environment within which it functions. The Cold War context that Cumings 
argued drew the lines of demarcation between area studies and international relations has gone. To use 
a Maoist concept (incorrectly), the primary contradiction is no longer a geo-strategic one based on 
security, but a geo-economic one based on increased economic interdependence (albeit an asymmetric 
interdependence) through greater trade and investment flows. And this means that the boundaries 
between the domestic and the international become ever more blurred, requiring an analysis of how the 
two interact: 
 “The separation between the global and the local no longer holds, as the new hierarchies of the 
global economy cut across regional and national boundaries”40 
This in turn requires an understanding of the dynamics of the external environment, actors and 
processes. 
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In the case of “Chinese studies”, the end of the geo-strategic context of study has coincided with the 
end of a period of relative autarky. Until perhaps as late as Deng Xiaoping’s nan xun in 1992, Chinese 
politics could be studied almost entirely in terms of domestic dynamics. And while I would contend 
that such “domesticism” was no longer efficacious for much of the 1990s, China’s post-WTO political 
economy clearly cannot be considered without a recognition of the role of external factors. 
 
The debate over the validity and future of area studies versus discipline should not just be conducted 
within the narrow confines of US academia, and in the specific context of a revolt against hegemonic 
approaches in the shape of economics and rational choice theory. As Kasaba argues41, area studies 
requires a “revitalizing” impact by combining the study of individual cultures and areas with wider 
disciplinary understanding – not rational choice “science”, but other disciplines that help us best 
understand the local-global context of the contemporary world. Kesaba’s main interest is in 
postmodernist approaches – and while this is not my own interest here, I share his basic tenet that the 
aim is not to replace old disciplinary barriers between “area studies” and “international relations” with 
new barriers: 
 “In order not to use this as yet another way of creating divisions, we should start from the 
premise that the modern era is generative its own comprehensive world view that 
encompasses all places and groups who are in interaction with each other”42 
 
So if we move away from an internecine battle within US academia, we can find ways in which area 
and discipline come together to enhance each other. This is done by recognising that there are a set of 
internationalised factors that face most, if not all states – factors that can fall under the broad heading 
of “globalisation”. But also by recognising that these globalising factors will play out in different ways 
in different states because of the embedded domestic contexts of each individual state43. We need the 
discipline to understand the former, and the area studies to understand the latter.  
 
As noted above, there is more than one understanding of what political economy actually is as a field of 
inquiry. From the above, it should also be clear that like many from the area studies discipline(s), I am 
not promoting economistic interpretations, or those of rational choice theory. The approach I emphasise 
here is what might be called “critical IPE”. And I suggest that in this IPE can provide the 
methodological and ontological tools that fit best with the specific knowledge of “national conditions” 
of area studies specialists to provide the best chance of studying IR under conditions of globalisation. 
 
At its most basic level, such IPE starts from two assumptions – that analytical divisions between the 
international and the domestic, and between economics and politics, should be broken down. Critical 
IPE is thus more holistic in its approach than “traditional” IR. Perhaps even more fundamentally, it has 
at its heart a concern with the relationship between structure and agency (though not insisting on an 
ontological separation of the two44 For Gamble45, it is an approach which also attempts to recapture the 
spirit of classical political economy.  
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But in its broadest possible definition to capture a wide as possible set of scholarship, this critical IPE 
is perhaps best understood in what it rejects – in what it stands against more than what it stands for. 
Thus, I suggest that this IPE can be defined as standing against pure economistic interpretations, 
against rational choice theory, and against statist and realist international relations. For all that divides 
the numerous critical IPE scholars, this rejectionism is more or less shared by all. And in at least two of 
these areas of rejection, it has much in common with Johnson’s suspicion and rejection of hegemonic 
and arrogant disciplinary approaches. 
 
The Pitfalls of Universalist IPE 
But in emphasising the benefits of utilising critical IPE approaches for studying Chinese IR, I am not 
suggesting that IPE has all the answers. On the contrary, a starting point for this paper is that IPE itself 
can become enhanced by taking on a more comparative nature that is aware of the contexts of 
individual states – and in particular, states from non-core areas of the global political economy. Just as 
there are methodological pitfalls in using dominant approaches to understand China’s IR in an era of 
globalisation, so too there are potential methodological pitfalls in the IPE literature. At the risk of 
oversimplification, these can be described as universalism, the OECD-centric nature of much IPE 
research, the emphasis on the nation state as the unit of analysis, and teleological pitfalls. 
 
Universalism 
The first pitfall is one that emerges from trying to make definitive statements that contain universal 
truths. Trying to find a once and for all answer to, for example, which has power, states or markets, is 
essentially misguided. The real quest should be twofold. The first is to discover differential levels of 
power in the international political economy – an approach which fits well with conceptions in the 
Chinese literature regarding the uneven nature of power in a unipolar globalised world. Quite simply, 
there are clear divergence in different state's ability to dictate, respond or react to globalising forces. 
This study, then, shares an understanding with those scholars who perceive globalisation as an uneven 
process46. For proponents of this view, rather than globalisation leading to harmonisation and 
convergence: 
 “Existing inequalities make it more likely that globalization will lead to an increasingly sharp 
division between 'core' states, who share in the values and benefits of a global world economy 
and polity, and 'marginalised' states”47 
 
The second is to embrace divergence and, deploying the insights of area studies, consider how the 
relationship between states and power, between structure and agency, is determined within individual 
settings. IPE should not only allow diversity, but indeed emphasize the fact that there is no single 
answer; no single set of relationships; no single simple understanding. The researcher should consider, 
particularly through comparative approaches, how different sets of relationships emerge with different 
balances of power between actors in different and specific historical, geographical, social and political 
contexts. As Tim Shaw has argued: 
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 “any local to global social relationship inevitably includes a trio of heterogeneous actors … 
To be sure the balance among this trio varies between regions and issue-areas & over time but 
none of them can be excluded or overlooked in any ongoing relationship”48 
This is an approach that does not lead to simplicity. Nor does it lend itself to snappy book titles or 
defining characteristics that ensure good results on citation indexes. But as Hettne and Söderbaum49 
argue, the world is complex, and saying this is much better than truncating reality to the fit 
methodological or ideological predilection. 
 
IPE as a study of developed states 
The search for universal truths is helped when the universe is contracted. Tony Payne has argued that 
the theories of hegemony were largely constructed around observations of the US experience, 
moderated by some comparisons with Europe. What we end up with is a concept constructed from a 
narrow set of cases. More to the point, a concept that because it is so case (or a few cases) specific 
might not have relevance outside that setting. The same argument can be made for many of the 
approaches within IPE50. Once we move outside the setting of the case studies (either explicit or more 
inferential) that have been used to construct theory, then the applicability of theory becomes more 
questionable.  
 
One of the major research questions for IPE scholars is to consider the relationship between the state 
and the market. Indeed, there are around 100 published books in English alone where the main focus is 
to discuss the relationship in one way or another51. But much of this literature is based on 
understandings that are predicated on an understanding of the role of the state in the contemporary 
world that is based on the experience of advanced industrialised democracies. Such a separation of 
state and market that underpins much IPE analysis in the West does not always hold true outside the 
context of the west itself. 
 
Van Woferen52, for example, has long argued that analysts from the “west” fail to understand Japan 
because they start with false assumptions. The concept of a separation between “public” and “private” 
that lies at the heart of some investigations of political economy is, according to van Wolferen, absent 
in Japan. For Deans, this is a consequence both of “both the traditional understanding of ‘economy’ in 
East Asia and the way in which market economies were established there” 53. Indeed, in some respects, 
following Polanyi54 it is not so much Japanese capitalism that is “different” as European capitalism, 
and of course, the USA. It was the “great transformation” of industrialisation in Europe in the 
nineteenth century that marks the “singular departure” from the dominant norm by creating the 
institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere.  
 
In essence, the argument here is that the nature of the Japanese state and Japanese capitalism is 
different. It might have an industrial structure that looks a bit like a western one, but the nature of the 
state and the nature of Japanese capitalism is not the same as the nature of the US state and US 
capitalism, or European states and European capitalisms. Capitalism in Japan developed in a different 
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way from in the west due to “pre-industrial legacies, patterns of industrialization, and twentieth-century 
state structures and policies”55. Indeed, even within the west, there is no single model of capitalism, and 
no single model of “the state”. A study of comparative capitalisms, then, is an essential component of 
recognising divergence.  
 
There are effectively two problems here. The first is the aforementioned dominance of studies of 
advanced industrialised economies. Even in some of the best works on comparative capitalisms, the 
emphasis remains on advanced industrialised economies. Coates56, for example, concentrates on a 
comparison between the US, Sweden, Germany and the UK, while Crouch and Streeck57 similarly 
consider Italy, Sweden, the UK, France, the US and Japan. A similar tripartite analysis of Europe-the 
US-Japan is also evident in Berger and Dore58. While these works serve a very useful purpose in 
exposing the varieties of capitalism within advanced industrialised societies, the lack of analyses of less 
developed economies is marked.  
 
Similarly, with a brief exception for analyses of the Asian financial crises, discussions of developing 
states are in a minority in the major IPE journals. Here, though, we should note a difference between 
US journals and those in Europe – particularly the UK, and particularly in New Political Economy59. It 
is notable that among the editors of New Political Economy there is a strong “developing area” 
expertise. It is also the case that in inception, New Political Economy emphasises not a single 
theoretical approach, but a framework or “toolkit”60 which embraces non-exclusionary pluralistic 
approaches: 
 “The methodology of the new political economy rejects the old dichotomy between agency 
and structure, and states and markets, which fragmented classical political economy into 
separate disciplines. It seeks instead to build on those approaches in social sciences which 
have tried to develop an integrated analysis.61 
 
There may be good reasons for this relative under-representation, particularly in the US. One 
explanation could simply be that there are not enough people writing on developing areas using IPE 
perspectives. Another explanation is found in the good work on IPE that appears in development 
oriented journals and in “area studies” journals. Indeed, the logic of career enhancement often leads 
towards publishing in a relatively narrow set of journals conceived as the appropriate outlet by the peer 
community.  
 
The second problem emerges from the potential of concept stretching. If Van Wolferen is right, and 
western paradigms are used to try and understand things that look similar in Japan, then problem 
becomes magnified when we move on to look at states like China. When China was “different” – when 
it was a state planned economy – then it was relatively easy to analyse. We knew that it was different 
and treated it as such (though sometimes falsely putting it in a box with other “different” states – 
assuming that socialist economies were all the same for example). As China has reformed and moved 
 13 
away from socialism, we have perhaps found it increasingly difficult to box. Dealing with the bits that 
are still different remains relatively easy. The problem is the problem of the familiar. 
 
As just one example here, there is a widespread understanding of how stock markets work and why 
they exist in the west. And as china now has stock markets, it is tempting to assume that they serve the 
same functions in China and work in the same way as they do in London, Frankfurt or New York. But 
as China “area study” specialists know, not only do Chinese stock markets serve different purposes and 
interests, but the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen each have different characteristics. The 
embedded power of the state in the emerging Chinese market economy means that we have to be very 
careful in deploying modes of analysis devised from case studies in very different parts of the world. 
 
The nation state as the unit of analysis 
As with much of the economics and IR literature, there is still a tendency in IPE to consider the nation 
state as the unit of analysis. Even studies of globalisation normally consider how this impacts on states, 
rather than disaggregating the state as a unit of analysis. On a very simple level, we need to remember 
perhaps the first question of politics – who gets what ? So we should not ask if, for example, will China 
benefit from joining the WTO? But instead ask who will benefit and who will not. As China specialists 
know, reform has had a highly differential impact on Chinese society. The gap between the urban and 
the rural is just one example, to which we could add the benefits accruing to the existing elites versus 
the benefits accruing to the workers62, and many others.  
 
And of course, the Chinese case also reveals massive regional differentials – while some parts of China 
have become embedded within internationalised networks of production and are highly integrated into 
the global economy, other parts of the country are at best, only marginally participating. This is not to 
say that they are unaffected by globalisation, but to suggest that they are not internationally 
“integrated”. This is often explained by making a bipolar division between coastal and interior China. 
This approach is helpful in establishing the differential nature of the internationalisation of China – but 
only partially so. There are, for example, many TVEs in the interior which have benefited greatly from 
internationalisation, and have significantly contributed to the growth of Chinese exports. As such, 
while geographically based concepts of divergence are clearly important, they do not tell the whole 
story of the differential impact of globalisation on China. 
 
This recognition of the differential impact within nation states is manifest in only a few theoretical 
pieces considering the political economy of regional integration relatively small body of IR literature 
dealing with globalisation and integration63.  There are a number of good case studies discussing the 
significance of sub-national and cross-national regional integration in various parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, work on microregionalism, and the way that globalisation can lead to a disjuncture 
between the national political and emerging transnational economic spaced remains an understudied 
phenomenon64. In this respect, the work of area studies specialists (and political geographers) on and in 
China who emphasise the uneven spatial impact of jingji kaifang, particularly in terms of international 
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economic relations, are ahead of the game, and have much to offer comparative political economists 
and IPE theorists in general. 
 
Teleology and Politics: What Drives Globalisation? 
At this stage, this paper should really try and provide some definition of what is meant by globalisation. 
But after five years of the existence of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation at Warwick, perhaps 
the clearest collective finding is how contested the G-word is, and in many respects, how useless as an 
analytical term. From Kenichi Ohmae65 at one extreme to Hirst and Thomspon66 at the other, there is a 
vast literature attempting to understand what globalisation really means (or in the case of Hirst and 
Thompson, to ask if it is even happening at all). As of March 2002, a grand total of 1,500 books listed 
on the Amazon web page with globalisation or globalization in the title. As Taylor puts it: 
 “To say that “globalisation” is the new mantra of our contemporary era is to be at once both 
banal and profound. Few other words has been so used and abused in recent times, or have 
generated so much printed word and comment. Yet, for all the rhetoric surrounding 
globalisation, its meaning remains both vague and elusive and symbolises a host of different 
things to different people.”67 
In a similar vein, Hurrell notes that: 
 “Although rarely tied to any very clearly articulated theory, it has become a very powerful 
metaphor for the sense that a number of universal processes are at work generating increased 
interconnection and interdependence between states and between societies.”68 [original 
emphasis] 
As such, I am trying here to duck the issue of providing a clear definition, and instead consider some of 
the methodological pitfalls that exist in studying IR through globalisation lenses. 
 
One of the key potential pitfalls here is the danger of falling into teleological understandings of 
globalisation. To be fair, teleological explanations do not have much salience in IPE discourses in the 
west any more. However, in discussing globalisation in China, I have often come across the view that 
globalisation is an economic phenomena, and not a political one. This view is based on a separation of 
economics and politics that is also evident in wider interpretations of globalisation. In its extreme form 
this can lead to understandings that take globalisation as a given factor, or something that is divorced 
from politics.  
 
Critics will complain that this is a caricature of Chinese work on globalisation. They will point to the 
fact that Chinese scholarship on globalisation does consider how states can respond and live with 
globalisation, and also deals with the political implications of participating in a globalised economy. A 
good example comes from Wang Yizhou: 
 “globilisation also naturally represents a process of politics, which is used here in its widest 
sense. That is to say, in addition to the operation of government, the competition among 
upper-level leaders, and speeches given by various politicians, it includes decision-making, 
such as making development strategy, handling social conflict, assessing opportunity as well 
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as challenge, working out the timetable for opening up and participation. Economic 
globalisation has become a growing tendency, causing social instability in many countries. It 
urges national states in the age of globalisation to adjust or change their set agenda”69 
On one level, Wang’s piece is instructive in its recognition that globalisation impacts on state 
sovereignty and permeates into societal issues. It also recognises that globalisation doesn’t just happen, 
but is dependent on government decisions and policies. But on another level it is problematic as it 
considers the political dimensions of economic globalisation, without accepting that economic 
globalisation in itself is inherently political. 
 
In proposing an IPE framework for considering China’s IR in an era of globalisation, it is essential to 
start from an understanding that globalisation does not just happen. It is a phenomenon which is driven 
by a combination of technological advances, and changing patterns of production, which places a 
significant element of “power” in the decisions of non-state economic actors. It is also driven by the 
policy preferences and dominant ideas within the major international financial institutions. But as the 
above quote from Wang acknowledges, it is also the result of the actions and policies of governments. 
Crucially, and this is absent from Wang’s analysis, these decisions are predicated on an acceptance that 
participation in the global economy is beneficial to perceived interests, and based on an acceptance that 
neoliberal economic policies are the best way of generating growth. In this respect, globalization also 
entails an ideological dimension, and is not just economic process. In combination, as Bernard and 
Ravenhill argue in relation to the political economy of East Asia: 
 “We have argued that the emerging political economy of East Asia should be understood in 
terms of the relationship between changes in the global political economy, changes in the 
political economy of individual states, and changes in the organization of production.”70 
 
So a key impulse in the evolution of globalisation has been ideological change, and resultant 
governmental policies. Another key driving force has been technological changes which have 
facilitated changing modes of production. For Oman, a: 
 “principle macroeconomic force shaping those dynamics and driving ‘globalization’ …. is the 
ongoing development, formidable competitive strength, and spread …. of post-Taylorist 
“flexible” approaches to the organization of production within and between firms’.71 
While there has always been world trade, the structure of that trade has changed. Rather than raw 
materials flowing to production sites, and finished goods flowing to markets, the production of a single 
commodity can now take place at a number of  different stages in a number of different states.  
“capitalism today…entails the detailed disaggregation of stages of production and 
consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational structure of densely 
networked firms or enterprises’ .72 
As such the investment-trade nexus has become increasingly significant, as investments move to the 
most profitable location for specific parts of the production cycle.  
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So building on the work of Cox73, “new political economy” approach associated with Andrew Gamble, 
Tony Payne and others74 argues that the international economy of the Bretton Woods era characterised 
by exchange relations between national economies has been replaced by a global economy grounded in 
production and finance: 
“the formative aspect of the new global political economy is seen to be the structural power of 
internationally mobile capital. States now have to recognise the power not only of other states 
and international organisations …. but also of international capital, the banks, and foreign 
exchange markets.”75 
It is a system where non-sate actors play a significant role in shaping financial and commodity flows, 
but one in which states and state actors do much to facilitate the globalisation.  
 
In some respects, we have to take one step back and consider the political dimensions that lie behind 
the growing power of non-state actors in the global political economy. As the German Budestag report 
on globalization forcefully argued: 
 “The growing worldwide integration of economies came not by any law of nature – it has 
been the result of active and deliberate policies’.76 
First, we need to consider how non-state actors came to have such power in the first place. For 
example, while Susan Strange asserts that transnational corporations (TNCs) are key actors in the 
promotion of globalised production: 
 “this has not happened entirely by accident. The shift from state authority to market authority 
has been in large part the result of state policies. It was not that the TNCs stole or purloined 
power from the government of states. It was handed to them on a plate - and, moreover, for 
'reasons of state'."77 
Strange goes on to argue that even the US government could not contain the forces that it unleashed, 
and that even the world’s most powerful government finds its actions constrained by the actions of 
TNCs. But nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that the original liberalization of the economic 
structure was based on political choice and decisions. 
 
It might help here to distinguish between globalism as a statist project, and globaisation as a process. 
Globalism is a project which has been pursued with vigor by the successive US administrations, 
supported by the neo-liberal agendas of other governments in the advanced capitalist world. It sought 
to spread specific political, economic, security and social forms of interaction and understanding on a 
global spatial scale. It is symbolized in particular by Reagonite-Thatcherite efforts to spread the market 
economy, and promote neo-liberal economic strategies through both its own actions, and via the 
policies of the major international financial institutions. Globalization, in contrast, is a process of 
growing interconnectedness in these different dimensions driven where non-state actors utilise the 
economic and legal structures that have been established by political elites - for example, by business 
enterprises which develop a global strategy in order to maintain international competitiveness and 
ensure continued profitability. In short, globalism as a political project creates the environment in 
which globalization can proceed. 
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This analysis effectively concentrates on what we might call the initiators of globalization. But we also 
need to consider the political dynamic of globalization in developing states. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
much of the literature on developing states concentrated on the attempts to ensure that developing 
states did not become locked in a system of dependency on the core states. There is also a considerable 
literature on the way in which international financial institutions forced neoliberal agendas on 
developing countries through conditionalities on aid packages. But in the current era, the dynamic is 
very different. As Bowles argues: 
“By 1991 the purpose ….. was no longer premised on the need to be more independent of the 
global economy but rather seen as a measure to ensure continued participation in it. The fear 
of developing countries was no longer one of dependence on the global economy but rather 
was seen as a measure to ensure continued participation in it.”78 
If globalization is the new dependency theory, then it is in large parts a domestically self-imposed 
dependency – dependency as the best way of achieving growth. 
 
There are two key issues to consider here. The first is the “ideological” or “ideational” change. In short, 
key elites in much of the developing world have altered their policy preferences and accepted the neo-
liberal project as the best method of achieving growth. Perhaps more than anything else, this is what I 
mean when I argue that economic globalization in itself is inherently political.  
 
The second issue relates to specific policy changes designed to facilitate globalization. While the 
internet and telecommunications facilities increase the speed of communication, goods still have to be 
transported around the world on ships, trucks and trains. And in order to do this, you need the 
necessary “hard” infrastructure, more often provided through state investment rather than through 
private sector funding: 
“Transport and communications are “massively state-subsidised, and the overhead costs of 
transport and communication (e.g. policing, rules and regulations) are met not by the users but 
by the general public”79 
 
Furthermore, policies conducive to the international economy do not just occur on their own. The 
Special Economic Zones are not “natural economic territories”, as Scalapino80 has defined emerging 
cross border micro-regions – they were established through political fiat, and supported by other state 
policies on taxation, distribution and so on. And perhaps most importantly of all for the future, the 
decision to join the WTO, and to accept all the disciplining elements of neo-liberalism that will follow, 
was a political choice. 
 
In summary, this internal process of change has been promoted by what Leslie Sklair terms 
“globalising state bureaucrats” 81, who might also be considered as constituting a party-state comprador 
class. This group, epitomised by the policies of Zhu Rongji, is engaged in a process of making the 
investment regime within China more and more liberalised and “attractive” to international capital, and 
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reforming the domestic economic structure to reduce domestic protectionism, and institute a more 
neoliberal economic paradigm. In combination, these processes can best be understood by using a 
framework of analysis established by Robert Cox: 
“There is something that could be called a nascent historic bloc consisting of the most 
powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and the variety of networks 
that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology of globalisation. States now by and 
large play the role of agencies of the global political economy, with the task of adjusting 
national economic policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic 
liberalism. This structure of power is sustained from outside the state through a global policy 
consensus and the influence of global finance over state policy, and from inside the state from 
those social forces that benefit from globalisation (the segment of society that is integrated 
into the world economy)…Neo-liberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of 
policy.”82 
 
 
Towards a Framework of Analysis 
Studying Chinese IR 
In terms of the study of China’s international relations, this framework suggests moving away from 
bilateral and statist interpretations of IR. In particular, its suggests an increased attention on the 
interaction between Chinese state elites at various levels, and external non-state actors. There is a lot of 
good research being undertaken on the way in which parts of China are integrating with the global 
economy, with a particular and entirely proper emphasis on China’s coastal provinces. This work 
which emphasises the partial national nature of integration into the global economy, and points to 
issues related to the integration of the national economy as a whole makes an important contribution to 
theoretical understandings regarding the impact of globalisation on nation states. However, there are 
two areas in which this work needs strengthening. 
 
The first is in the way that these analyses fit into overall analyses of China’s IR. While some may reject 
this on the grounds that the relationships under investigation are purely economic, this denies the 
linkages between politics and economics outlined above. The role and importance of local governments 
is also important on the side of the external partners as well. Gilbert Rozman83 and Glenn Hook84, for 
example, have written extensively on the role of local governments in Japan in forging economic links 
with Japan’s neighbours. Indeed, the local-local nexus is already an important component in Sino-
Japanese economic relations. Witness, for example, the links between the sister cities of Kita Kyushu 
and Dalian. These links are not just built on local government dialogue. The local state is the key 
facilitator, but contacts are also dependent on local bureaux of MITI, local governments, Japanese 
representative offices in China, individual companies, the relationship between different companies in 
the supply chain85, providers of transportation, and even the role of Chinese students who have returned 
to China after being educated in Japan86. In this case, the role of the local state acting to further the 
interests of non-state economic actors (primarily on the Japanese side) is particularly notable.  
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Second, it is important not to focus to closely on specific localised manifestations such relationships. 
There is, for example, now a considerable literature on the emergence of this thing called “Greater 
China”. Some of this literature (good examples include Naughton87 and Hamilton88) has, at its heart, an 
understanding of the complexities of the relationship. Going beyond a simple bilateral level of analysis, 
they consider the wider regional and global processes involved. But many others do not. They are 
instead over-concerned with, for example, showing how China is trying to ensnare Taiwan through 
economic relations.  
 
Even some of those analyses that recognise that the political borders of China are not the parameters of 
economic activity, they then often replace a politically defined boundary of economic activity with 
another one – even if this new one is the conflation of a number of different political boundaries. An 
understanding of a “Greater China” economic space is constructed which does as much to underplay 
the significance of Japan and the United States in the construction of capitalist processes within which 
localised forms of relationships exist. A concept designed to illuminate the transnational nature of 
economic relations can, without care, obscure more than it reveals. 
 
We need to move beyond this national basis of analysis, even when the national basis of analysis itself 
moves beyond bilateralism. We should think of how the particular and the localised fit with wider 
regional/international modes of analysis. It is entirely correct to focus on the way in which localised 
relationships between local Chinese officials and Hong Kong and/or Taiwanese businessmen is helping 
shape China’s re-engagement with the global economy. But these local sets of relationships do not 
exist in isolation. Regional and global modes of production are primarily transmitted or linked into 
China through more localised relationships. Indeed, overseas Chinese networks often deliberately 
exploit cultural links in locating themselves in China. But these localised relationships are themselves 
predicated on the wider structure of a regional and global economy. The overall structure may be a 
regional one, or indeed even a global one. But the mechanism through which China is integrated can be 
a local one, or indeed, through a number of different local processes. Thus, I follow Smart’s 
understanding that: 
 “many capitalist practices are embedded in local structures, and that certain contexts can 
generate new and vibrant variations upon the theme of capitalism. If nothing else, 
globalization produces a considerably diverse set of local outcomes.”89 
 
Simply focusing on bilateral relationships, even if we disaggregate the states, do not provide a full 
explanation of “what is going on”. The most obvious example of this pitfall of bilateralism in trying to 
understand the dynamics of international economic relations lies in an assessment of trade relationships 
with Hong Kong. If we just focussed on the bilateral, then we would assume that Hong Kong is awash 
with Chinese imports, to the extent that it would be impossible to walk through the streets because they 
would be stocked with containers. But as we all know, this is not the case, as much of what is exported 
from China to Hong Kong is re-exported on to third destinations. 
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We can take a trilateral approach and try and work out where these goods are re-exported to from Hong 
Kong90. At least this gives us a more nuanced understanding of direction of trade statistics and their 
implications than simply using raw China or importer country customs data91. But while this helps us 
go beyond the bilateral on the export side, we also need to consider the import and investment side. 
Again, the example of Hong Kong is the most obvious, as it still acts as a financial and also physical 
conduit between China and the world, notwithstanding the opening of China.  
 
But it is a feature of China’s international economic relations that also extends beyond relations with 
Hong Kong. The classic example used by the Chinese authorities is that of Barbie Dolls. This rather 
low tech commodity is produced in China and carries the “made in China” stamp. But it is produced by 
a US company through a contract with a Taiwanese company, which imports raw materials from Japan 
and the Middle East, before re-exporting the dolls to markets in the developed world92.  
 
If anything, the internationalised nature of these commodity driven production networks is more 
evident in the production of more higher tech goods. For example, Sasuga has show that computers 
bearing the “made in China” stamp produced through Taiwanese investments in Southern China (now 
primarily Dongguan) contain virtually no Chinese content other than occasional inputs to peripherals 
(ie: plastic casing for keyboards etc). The high tech components are all produced in Taiwan, Japan or 
the US, with most of the Taiwanese companies operating under OEM licenses with original companies 
in Japan or the US93. 
 
The structure of regional capitalism, then, goes much deeper than bilateral levels of analysis can hope 
to explain. One of Sasuga’s key concerns is how Taiwanese investment in southern China is leading to 
new structures of governance – how the localised relationship plays out. But crucially, he 
acknowledges that this is merely the local manifestation of a wider process of industrial agglomeration, 
changes in production processes, and internationalised production chains driven by the spread of global 
capitalism. 
 
Nor can the implications of such processes be explained by the type of statist and intergovernmentalist 
approaches to understanding East Asian regionalism that dominates in Chinese IR (and indeed in non-
Chinese IR). Rather, we need to deploy modes of analysis that think in terms of production networks 
and/or class alliances that cut across politically drawn boundaries94.  
 
In particular, for those of us from a politics tradition, we should not forget basic and fundamental 
questions. Who gets what? Whose interests are served? If these questions are asked, then we can start 
to see more clearly how, alongside bilateral processes, Sino-Japanese relations or Sino-Taiwanese 
relationships are embedded in a wider network of relationships – even if these relationships are 
manifest in localised networks of overseas Chinese businessmen and mainland party-state-
entrepreneurs. This understanding, then, does not posit the local against the regional or the regional 
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against the global as loci of analysis. Rather, it suggests that assessing the relationship between the 
local the regional (and multiple forms of region) and the global remains a fruitful avenue for research 
in the future. 
 
Studying Chinese Politics 
One of the basic tenets of the NPE approach is that the distinction between the domestic and the 
international needs to be broken down. As such, deploying IPE approaches not only has efficacy for 
studying IR, but also for the study of domestic Chinese politics. Even before China’s entry into the 
WTO, this assertion held true. But in the coming years as, for example, China’s legal structure 
continues the ongoing process of becoming WTO compliant, the significance of the global for the 
domestic in China will become increasingly apparent. It will remain entirely correct to consider the 
actions of Chinese elites from an understanding of the specific social, economic, historical and cultural 
context of China. But any such analyses will also have to consider the context of globalization, and the 
way that the market or neoliberalism has a disciplining impact on domestic polities. 
 
Following from this, we need to internationalise the study of factional formation and political alliances 
in China. I content that the decision to join the WTO in 1999 cannot be considered without a 
recognition of an alliance between reformers in Beijing, and those in the US and elsewhere that wanted 
to promote a type of reform in China that conforms with international norms and the interests of the 
“international community”. This idea is perhaps best summed up by an official White House statement 
of March 2000 
“China's accession agreement will deepen and help to lock in market reforms -- and empower 
those in China's leadership who want their country to move further and faster toward 
economic freedom. In opening China's telecommunications market, including to Internet and 
satellite services, the agreement will expose the Chinese people to information, ideas, and 
debate from around the world. And China's accession to the WTO will help strengthen the rule 
of law in China and increase the likelihood that it will play by global rules”95 
Nor is it just an American approach, as the EUs trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy’s speech in Beijing 
in October 2000 illustrates: 
 “It can only lock in and deepen market reforms, empowering those in the leadership who 
support further and faster moves towards economic freedom”.96 
 
The boundaries between economics and politics as academic disciplines also need to be broken down. I 
suggest that the chief constraint on economic restructuring – particularly within the financial system – 
is political will, and the biggest challenge to political stability lies in how the leadership handles 
economic restructuring97. Add this to the national-international linkages noted above, and we arrive at a 
situation that is almost the basic defining characteristic of IPE as a field of enquiry. Returning again to 
the WTO issue, the delays in reaching a final agreement after the November 1999 agreement between 
China and the USTRO can largely be explained by considering how domestic political demands in each 
negotiating partner were played out in an international forum.  
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It is perhaps worth reiterating that I am not denying that the state is still important. What I am 
suggesting is that an understanding of the dynamics of power within China needs to be modified. This 
modification should accept that sovereignty, in the economic sphere at least, is “perforated”98 and that 
external actors now do have an influence over the functioning of the Chinese political economy. As 
suggested in the introduction, globalization has increased the number of actors in policy making, and, I 
suggest, increased the power of external actors.  
 
It should also recognise that, in Sassen’s words, the global becomes embedded within the national. She 
argues that the effects of economic globalization often “materialize in national territories”99 and that: 
“the strategic spaces where global processes are embedded are often national; the mechanisms 
through which new legal forms, necessary for globalization, are implemented are often part of 
national state institutions”100  
Following Sassen, then, we need to investigate the impact of globalization on the institutional balance 
of power within China’s governmental structures – as suggested in the introduction, to argue that 
globalization leads to a renogotiation of relationships between state actors. Sassen’s main emphasis 
was on the shifting balance of power between different ministries and agencies within government – 
the financial agencies may gain power and influence while others may lose. In the specific case of the 
WTO, we can suggest that the state organs in charge of reforming the legal structure in WTO 
conforming manners within the National People’s Congress will play an increasingly important role in 
shaping the bases of China’s domestic political economy. While separating the state from the party is 
still an inherently difficult task in China, WTO membership should further strengthen the role of state 
organs, particularly legal institutions of the NPC, vis-à-vis those of the party. In this respect, 
fundamental political reform in China is inspired, or perhaps more correctly, facilitated, by an 
international economic agreement. 
 
What this suggests, then, is that the search for political change in China should not be constrained by 
views that equate political change with democratisation, or those that conceive that economic reform 
inevitably leads to democratisation101. Ironically, while such approaches were designed to explain the 
link between economic and political change, equating political change with political liberalisation can 
actually contribute to the depoliticisation of analyses of economic change – no liberalisation is equated 
with no political reform. Abandoning state planning and ownership in favour of market forces and 
private modes of ownership are clearly not apolitical. But searching for democratisation and 
liberalisation (at this stage of China’s transition from socialism at least) does not allow us to understand 
the nature of this political change. Rather, we should be assessing the reformulation of political 
alliances and strategies – alliances within China’s political elites, between political elites and new 
economic elites, between elites and societal groups, and between domestic and transnational actors.  
 
Class is important. I noted above the efficacy of using notions of trans-national class alliances to 
understand the political implications of economic change. But there is also a domestic dynamic to this 
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change. A recent report from the department of sociology at CASS has outlined how the Chinese social 
structure can now be divided into ten broad groups, each of which can be subdivided into smaller sub 
groups102. Notably, the report uses the definition of jieceng or social level, rather than class (jieji), but 
the basic understanding that economic reform has led to a reformulation of the bases of Chinese society 
would not be out of place in a class based analysis.  
 
This changes has been occurring long before China’s WTO entry. There has, for example, been a 
relatively large body of work considering the rise of new business elites in China103. There is also a 
smaller body of work that considers the exploitation of Chinese workers (often by party-state 
managerial classes in collaboration with external capitalists)104 and the creation of an “underclass” 
through what Solinger terms the “informalisation” of the Chinese urban economy105. 
 
But one of the implications of WTO entry could be to accelerate those changes. For example, even 
under rosy assumptions like those produced by the Beijing Bureau of the World Bank, those industries 
and sectors that stand to lose most, even under rosy assumptions, are those where the hand of the state 
– or the hand of the old style of state control – still dominates106. Those that stand to gain most – in 
particularly clothing and textiles – are sectors where the new quasi-private sector and foreign 
ownership dominate. For example, attempts to calculate the impact of WTO entry on China’s share of 
world markets suggest that Chinese exports of clothing will rise from 19.5 per cent of world exports in 
1995 to 42.2 per cent in 2005107. The new opportunities in the service industry will likewise favour 
those who are not under old-style state control. To call it a quasi-privatisation of the Chinese economy 
is perhaps pushing it too far – not least because current party-state officials (the party-state bourgeoisie) 
are key actors in the new non-state economy. But WTO membership will further facilitate the 
ownership basis of the Chinese economy and the class basis of CCP rule that has been ongoing since 
1994. 
 
So while IPE as a discipline is largely concerned with the relationship between state and non-state 
actors, in the Chinese case, the emphasis should be on how these relationships are emerging. In 
particular, although the way in which a new bourgeois class (or classes) emerge from within the 
existing party state elites – and the way that they utilise their political position to enhance their 
economic position – has been the subject of some good studies108, it is an issue that warrants further 
attention.  
 
Finally, we need to consider ideology and ideational change. If “neo-liberalism is hegemonic 
ideologically and in terms of policy”109 as Cox suggests, then we need to consider the mechanisms by 
which it becomes hegemonic. This is partly a result of the use of blunt instruments of power by the 
core states to enforce change on developing countries. For example, in developing his concept of 
“disciplinary neoliberalism”, Stephen Gill argued that: 
 “the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of power, linked to a 
reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the disciplines 
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of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself.”110 
Although published almost seven years before China joined the WTO, this understanding could have 
all but been designed to understand the process. 
 
But there are also many much less blunt ways in which ideas are transferred from one setting to 
another. Through educational exchanges, the provision of training programmes to allow Chinese 
officials to become “WTO compliant”, the rise of the internet, and increased access to the outside 
world, and so on, Chinese academics, government researchers and policy makers. Business people too 
are developing new concepts and practices through processes of “social learning” and “industrial 
learning”. Chinese government policy is increasingly being shaped by the actions of pro-market 
“policy entrepreneurs”, and also by epistemic communities that are often transnational in nature111. 
And just as the Japanese authorities deliberately cultivated people who thought would become the next 
generation of Chinese leaders in the declining years of the Qing dynasty, so we should consider the 
various “aid” and “training” packages offered to Chinese officials in the light of WTO entry to have a 
clear, if not always explicit, political context.  
 
Conclusions 
In a special edition of New Political Economy in November 2000, Higgott and I called for: 
 “the need for regional-based groups/communities of scholars to talk more within a 
disciplinary framework in order to provide a basis for dialogue and comparison”112 
This desire to imbue area studies with more discipline, whilst accepting that more analyses of non-core 
states can enhance the discipline itself, was also at the core of Payne’s important paper on the political 
economy of area studies and IPE113. The aim of this paper, then, is to make a contribution to an 
understanding of how the area specialists and the disciplinary specialists can come together to improve 
the study of each.  
 
It starts from an understanding that the way that China “receives” or “responds” to globalization is very 
much embedded in the specific historical, political and cultural contexts that have influenced the 
emergence of the contemporary Chinese political economy. But it is no longer possible to simply 
consider this Chinese political economy by only considering the internal dynamics of change. Through 
conscious political decision, elements of the Chinese leadership have chosen to integrate China – or at 
least, parts of China – into the global political economy. In the process, they have allowed Chinese 
sovereignty, in the economic sphere at least, to become “perforated”, and increased the number of 
actors in the policy sphere. As Stange so forcefully put it in response to Krasner in the Review of 
Political Economy, “Wake up …. The world has changed”114. We need the country knowledge and the 
disciplinary knowledge to truly understand the dynamics at work.  
 
Good political economy should, almost in conception, be comparative political economy. In developing 
an IPE framework for the study of contemporary China, we can also contribute to the evolution of a 
discipline that looks away from the core heartlands of both the global political economy and the 
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heartlands of IPE academia. As such, the future of both area studies and IPE can perhaps best be 
enriched by each acknowledging the merits of each other, and facilitating a more comprehensive 
literature on the political economy of developing states. 
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